openclaw-vainplex/src/security/audit.test.ts
Dominic a8ad242f88
fix(security): properly test Windows ACL audit for config includes (#2403)
* fix(security): properly test Windows ACL audit for config includes

The test expected fs.config_include.perms_writable on Windows but
chmod 0o644 has no effect on Windows ACLs. Use icacls to grant
Everyone write access, which properly triggers the security check.

Also stubs execIcacls to return proper ACL output so the audit
can parse permissions without running actual icacls on the system.

Adds cleanup via try/finally to remove temp directory containing
world-writable test file.

Fixes checks-windows CI failure.

* test: isolate heartbeat runner tests from user workspace

* docs: update changelog for #2403

---------

Co-authored-by: Tyler Yust <TYTYYUST@YAHOO.COM>
2026-01-26 16:27:53 -08:00

1334 lines
39 KiB
TypeScript

import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import type { ClawdbotConfig } from "../config/config.js";
import type { ChannelPlugin } from "../channels/plugins/types.js";
import { runSecurityAudit } from "./audit.js";
import { discordPlugin } from "../../extensions/discord/src/channel.js";
import { slackPlugin } from "../../extensions/slack/src/channel.js";
import { telegramPlugin } from "../../extensions/telegram/src/channel.js";
import fs from "node:fs/promises";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
const isWindows = process.platform === "win32";
describe("security audit", () => {
it("includes an attack surface summary (info)", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
channels: { whatsapp: { groupPolicy: "open" }, telegram: { groupPolicy: "allowlist" } },
tools: { elevated: { enabled: true, allowFrom: { whatsapp: ["+1"] } } },
hooks: { enabled: true },
browser: { enabled: true },
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "summary.attack_surface", severity: "info" }),
]),
);
});
it("flags non-loopback bind without auth as critical", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
bind: "lan",
auth: {},
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
env: {},
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(
res.findings.some((f) => f.checkId === "gateway.bind_no_auth" && f.severity === "critical"),
).toBe(true);
});
it("warns when loopback control UI lacks trusted proxies", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
bind: "loopback",
controlUi: { enabled: true },
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",
severity: "warn",
}),
]),
);
});
it("flags loopback control UI without auth as critical", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
bind: "loopback",
controlUi: { enabled: true },
auth: {},
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
env: {},
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "gateway.loopback_no_auth",
severity: "critical",
}),
]),
);
});
it("flags logging.redactSensitive=off", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
logging: { redactSensitive: "off" },
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "logging.redact_off", severity: "warn" }),
]),
);
});
it("treats Windows ACL-only perms as secure", async () => {
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-win-"));
const stateDir = path.join(tmp, "state");
await fs.mkdir(stateDir, { recursive: true });
const configPath = path.join(stateDir, "clawdbot.json");
await fs.writeFile(configPath, "{}\n", "utf-8");
const user = "DESKTOP-TEST\\Tester";
const execIcacls = async (_cmd: string, args: string[]) => ({
stdout: `${args[0]} NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(F)\n ${user}:(F)\n`,
stderr: "",
});
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: {},
includeFilesystem: true,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
stateDir,
configPath,
platform: "win32",
env: { ...process.env, USERNAME: "Tester", USERDOMAIN: "DESKTOP-TEST" },
execIcacls,
});
const forbidden = new Set([
"fs.state_dir.perms_world_writable",
"fs.state_dir.perms_group_writable",
"fs.state_dir.perms_readable",
"fs.config.perms_writable",
"fs.config.perms_world_readable",
"fs.config.perms_group_readable",
]);
for (const id of forbidden) {
expect(res.findings.some((f) => f.checkId === id)).toBe(false);
}
});
it("flags Windows ACLs when Users can read the state dir", async () => {
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-win-open-"));
const stateDir = path.join(tmp, "state");
await fs.mkdir(stateDir, { recursive: true });
const configPath = path.join(stateDir, "clawdbot.json");
await fs.writeFile(configPath, "{}\n", "utf-8");
const user = "DESKTOP-TEST\\Tester";
const execIcacls = async (_cmd: string, args: string[]) => {
const target = args[0];
if (target === stateDir) {
return {
stdout: `${target} NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(F)\n BUILTIN\\Users:(RX)\n ${user}:(F)\n`,
stderr: "",
};
}
return {
stdout: `${target} NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(F)\n ${user}:(F)\n`,
stderr: "",
};
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: {},
includeFilesystem: true,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
stateDir,
configPath,
platform: "win32",
env: { ...process.env, USERNAME: "Tester", USERDOMAIN: "DESKTOP-TEST" },
execIcacls,
});
expect(
res.findings.some(
(f) => f.checkId === "fs.state_dir.perms_readable" && f.severity === "warn",
),
).toBe(true);
});
it("warns when small models are paired with web/browser tools", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agents: { defaults: { model: { primary: "ollama/mistral-8b" } } },
tools: {
web: {
search: { enabled: true },
fetch: { enabled: true },
},
},
browser: { enabled: true },
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
const finding = res.findings.find((f) => f.checkId === "models.small_params");
expect(finding?.severity).toBe("critical");
expect(finding?.detail).toContain("mistral-8b");
expect(finding?.detail).toContain("web_search");
expect(finding?.detail).toContain("web_fetch");
expect(finding?.detail).toContain("browser");
});
it("treats small models as safe when sandbox is on and web tools are disabled", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agents: { defaults: { model: { primary: "ollama/mistral-8b" }, sandbox: { mode: "all" } } },
tools: {
web: {
search: { enabled: false },
fetch: { enabled: false },
},
},
browser: { enabled: false },
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
const finding = res.findings.find((f) => f.checkId === "models.small_params");
expect(finding?.severity).toBe("info");
expect(finding?.detail).toContain("mistral-8b");
expect(finding?.detail).toContain("sandbox=all");
});
it("flags tools.elevated allowFrom wildcard as critical", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
tools: {
elevated: {
allowFrom: { whatsapp: ["*"] },
},
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "tools.elevated.allowFrom.whatsapp.wildcard",
severity: "critical",
}),
]),
);
});
it("flags remote browser control without token as critical", async () => {
const prev = process.env.CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_CONTROL_TOKEN;
delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_CONTROL_TOKEN;
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
browser: {
controlUrl: "http://example.com:18791",
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "browser.control_remote_no_token",
severity: "critical",
}),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prev === undefined) delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_CONTROL_TOKEN;
else process.env.CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_CONTROL_TOKEN = prev;
}
});
it("warns when browser control token matches gateway auth token", async () => {
const token = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: { auth: { token } },
browser: { controlUrl: "https://browser.example.com", controlToken: token },
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "browser.control_token_reuse_gateway_token",
severity: "warn",
}),
]),
);
});
it("warns when remote browser control uses HTTP", async () => {
const prev = process.env.CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_CONTROL_TOKEN;
delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_CONTROL_TOKEN;
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
browser: {
controlUrl: "http://example.com:18791",
controlToken: "0123456789abcdef01234567",
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "browser.control_remote_http", severity: "warn" }),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prev === undefined) delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_CONTROL_TOKEN;
else process.env.CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_CONTROL_TOKEN = prev;
}
});
it("warns when control UI allows insecure auth", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
controlUi: { allowInsecureAuth: true },
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth",
severity: "critical",
}),
]),
);
});
it("warns when control UI device auth is disabled", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
controlUi: { dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth: true },
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "gateway.control_ui.device_auth_disabled",
severity: "critical",
}),
]),
);
});
it("warns when multiple DM senders share the main session", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = { session: { dmScope: "main" } };
const plugins: ChannelPlugin[] = [
{
id: "whatsapp",
meta: {
id: "whatsapp",
label: "WhatsApp",
selectionLabel: "WhatsApp",
docsPath: "/channels/whatsapp",
blurb: "Test",
},
capabilities: { chatTypes: ["direct"] },
config: {
listAccountIds: () => ["default"],
resolveAccount: () => ({}),
isEnabled: () => true,
isConfigured: () => true,
},
security: {
resolveDmPolicy: () => ({
policy: "allowlist",
allowFrom: ["user-a", "user-b"],
policyPath: "channels.whatsapp.dmPolicy",
allowFromPath: "channels.whatsapp.",
approveHint: "approve",
}),
},
},
];
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: true,
plugins,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "channels.whatsapp.dm.scope_main_multiuser",
severity: "warn",
}),
]),
);
});
it("flags Discord native commands without a guild user allowlist", async () => {
const prevStateDir = process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-discord-"));
process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = tmp;
await fs.mkdir(path.join(tmp, "credentials"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
channels: {
discord: {
enabled: true,
token: "t",
groupPolicy: "allowlist",
guilds: {
"123": {
channels: {
general: { allow: true },
},
},
},
},
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: true,
plugins: [discordPlugin],
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "channels.discord.commands.native.no_allowlists",
severity: "warn",
}),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prevStateDir == null) delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
else process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = prevStateDir;
}
});
it("does not flag Discord slash commands when dm.allowFrom includes a Discord snowflake id", async () => {
const prevStateDir = process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(
path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-discord-allowfrom-snowflake-"),
);
process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = tmp;
await fs.mkdir(path.join(tmp, "credentials"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
channels: {
discord: {
enabled: true,
token: "t",
dm: { allowFrom: ["387380367612706819"] },
groupPolicy: "allowlist",
guilds: {
"123": {
channels: {
general: { allow: true },
},
},
},
},
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: true,
plugins: [discordPlugin],
});
expect(res.findings).not.toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "channels.discord.commands.native.no_allowlists",
}),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prevStateDir == null) delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
else process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = prevStateDir;
}
});
it("flags Discord slash commands when access-group enforcement is disabled and no users allowlist exists", async () => {
const prevStateDir = process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-discord-open-"));
process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = tmp;
await fs.mkdir(path.join(tmp, "credentials"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
commands: { useAccessGroups: false },
channels: {
discord: {
enabled: true,
token: "t",
groupPolicy: "allowlist",
guilds: {
"123": {
channels: {
general: { allow: true },
},
},
},
},
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: true,
plugins: [discordPlugin],
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "channels.discord.commands.native.unrestricted",
severity: "critical",
}),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prevStateDir == null) delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
else process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = prevStateDir;
}
});
it("flags Slack slash commands without a channel users allowlist", async () => {
const prevStateDir = process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-slack-"));
process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = tmp;
await fs.mkdir(path.join(tmp, "credentials"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
channels: {
slack: {
enabled: true,
botToken: "xoxb-test",
appToken: "xapp-test",
groupPolicy: "open",
slashCommand: { enabled: true },
},
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: true,
plugins: [slackPlugin],
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "channels.slack.commands.slash.no_allowlists",
severity: "warn",
}),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prevStateDir == null) delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
else process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = prevStateDir;
}
});
it("flags Slack slash commands when access-group enforcement is disabled", async () => {
const prevStateDir = process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-slack-open-"));
process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = tmp;
await fs.mkdir(path.join(tmp, "credentials"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
commands: { useAccessGroups: false },
channels: {
slack: {
enabled: true,
botToken: "xoxb-test",
appToken: "xapp-test",
groupPolicy: "open",
slashCommand: { enabled: true },
},
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: true,
plugins: [slackPlugin],
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "channels.slack.commands.slash.useAccessGroups_off",
severity: "critical",
}),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prevStateDir == null) delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
else process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = prevStateDir;
}
});
it("flags Telegram group commands without a sender allowlist", async () => {
const prevStateDir = process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-telegram-"));
process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = tmp;
await fs.mkdir(path.join(tmp, "credentials"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
channels: {
telegram: {
enabled: true,
botToken: "t",
groupPolicy: "allowlist",
groups: { "-100123": {} },
},
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: true,
plugins: [telegramPlugin],
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "channels.telegram.groups.allowFrom.missing",
severity: "critical",
}),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prevStateDir == null) delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR;
else process.env.CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR = prevStateDir;
}
});
it("adds a warning when deep probe fails", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = { gateway: { mode: "local" } };
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
deep: true,
deepTimeoutMs: 50,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
probeGatewayFn: async () => ({
ok: false,
url: "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",
connectLatencyMs: null,
error: "connect failed",
close: null,
health: null,
status: null,
presence: null,
configSnapshot: null,
}),
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "gateway.probe_failed", severity: "warn" }),
]),
);
});
it("adds a warning when deep probe throws", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = { gateway: { mode: "local" } };
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
deep: true,
deepTimeoutMs: 50,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
probeGatewayFn: async () => {
throw new Error("probe boom");
},
});
expect(res.deep?.gateway.ok).toBe(false);
expect(res.deep?.gateway.error).toContain("probe boom");
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "gateway.probe_failed", severity: "warn" }),
]),
);
});
it("warns on legacy model configuration", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agents: { defaults: { model: { primary: "openai/gpt-3.5-turbo" } } },
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "models.legacy", severity: "warn" }),
]),
);
});
it("warns on weak model tiers", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agents: { defaults: { model: { primary: "anthropic/claude-haiku-4-5" } } },
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "models.weak_tier", severity: "warn" }),
]),
);
});
it("warns when hooks token looks short", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
hooks: { enabled: true, token: "short" },
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "hooks.token_too_short", severity: "warn" }),
]),
);
});
it("warns when hooks token reuses the gateway env token", async () => {
const prevToken = process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN;
process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN = "shared-gateway-token-1234567890";
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
hooks: { enabled: true, token: "shared-gateway-token-1234567890" },
};
try {
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "hooks.token_reuse_gateway_token", severity: "warn" }),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prevToken === undefined) delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN;
else process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN = prevToken;
}
});
it("warns when state/config look like a synced folder", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
stateDir: "/Users/test/Dropbox/.clawdbot",
configPath: "/Users/test/Dropbox/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json",
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "fs.synced_dir", severity: "warn" }),
]),
);
});
it("flags group/world-readable config include files", async () => {
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-"));
const stateDir = path.join(tmp, "state");
await fs.mkdir(stateDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
const includePath = path.join(stateDir, "extra.json5");
await fs.writeFile(includePath, "{ logging: { redactSensitive: 'off' } }\n", "utf-8");
if (isWindows) {
// Grant "Everyone" write access to trigger the perms_writable check on Windows
const { execSync } = await import("node:child_process");
execSync(`icacls "${includePath}" /grant Everyone:W`, { stdio: "ignore" });
} else {
await fs.chmod(includePath, 0o644);
}
const configPath = path.join(stateDir, "clawdbot.json");
await fs.writeFile(configPath, `{ "$include": "./extra.json5" }\n`, "utf-8");
await fs.chmod(configPath, 0o600);
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = { logging: { redactSensitive: "off" } };
const user = "DESKTOP-TEST\\Tester";
const execIcacls = isWindows
? async (_cmd: string, args: string[]) => {
const target = args[0];
if (target === includePath) {
return {
stdout: `${target} NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(F)\n BUILTIN\\Users:(W)\n ${user}:(F)\n`,
stderr: "",
};
}
return {
stdout: `${target} NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(F)\n ${user}:(F)\n`,
stderr: "",
};
}
: undefined;
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: true,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
stateDir,
configPath,
platform: isWindows ? "win32" : undefined,
env: isWindows
? { ...process.env, USERNAME: "Tester", USERDOMAIN: "DESKTOP-TEST" }
: undefined,
execIcacls,
});
const expectedCheckId = isWindows
? "fs.config_include.perms_writable"
: "fs.config_include.perms_world_readable";
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: expectedCheckId, severity: "critical" }),
]),
);
} finally {
// Clean up temp directory with world-writable file
await fs.rm(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it("flags extensions without plugins.allow", async () => {
const prevDiscordToken = process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN;
const prevTelegramToken = process.env.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN;
const prevSlackBotToken = process.env.SLACK_BOT_TOKEN;
const prevSlackAppToken = process.env.SLACK_APP_TOKEN;
delete process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN;
delete process.env.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN;
delete process.env.SLACK_BOT_TOKEN;
delete process.env.SLACK_APP_TOKEN;
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-"));
const stateDir = path.join(tmp, "state");
await fs.mkdir(path.join(stateDir, "extensions", "some-plugin"), {
recursive: true,
mode: 0o700,
});
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: true,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
stateDir,
configPath: path.join(stateDir, "clawdbot.json"),
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "plugins.extensions_no_allowlist", severity: "warn" }),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prevDiscordToken == null) delete process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN;
else process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN = prevDiscordToken;
if (prevTelegramToken == null) delete process.env.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN;
else process.env.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN = prevTelegramToken;
if (prevSlackBotToken == null) delete process.env.SLACK_BOT_TOKEN;
else process.env.SLACK_BOT_TOKEN = prevSlackBotToken;
if (prevSlackAppToken == null) delete process.env.SLACK_APP_TOKEN;
else process.env.SLACK_APP_TOKEN = prevSlackAppToken;
}
});
it("flags unallowlisted extensions as critical when native skill commands are exposed", async () => {
const prevDiscordToken = process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN;
delete process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN;
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clawdbot-security-audit-"));
const stateDir = path.join(tmp, "state");
await fs.mkdir(path.join(stateDir, "extensions", "some-plugin"), {
recursive: true,
mode: 0o700,
});
try {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
channels: {
discord: { enabled: true, token: "t" },
},
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: true,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
stateDir,
configPath: path.join(stateDir, "clawdbot.json"),
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "plugins.extensions_no_allowlist",
severity: "critical",
}),
]),
);
} finally {
if (prevDiscordToken == null) delete process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN;
else process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN = prevDiscordToken;
}
});
it("flags open groupPolicy when tools.elevated is enabled", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
tools: { elevated: { enabled: true, allowFrom: { whatsapp: ["+1"] } } },
channels: { whatsapp: { groupPolicy: "open" } },
};
const res = await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
});
expect(res.findings).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({
checkId: "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",
severity: "critical",
}),
]),
);
});
describe("maybeProbeGateway auth selection", () => {
const originalEnvToken = process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN;
const originalEnvPassword = process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_PASSWORD;
beforeEach(() => {
delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN;
delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_PASSWORD;
});
afterEach(() => {
if (originalEnvToken == null) {
delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN;
} else {
process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN = originalEnvToken;
}
if (originalEnvPassword == null) {
delete process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_PASSWORD;
} else {
process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_PASSWORD = originalEnvPassword;
}
});
it("uses local auth when gateway.mode is local", async () => {
let capturedAuth: { token?: string; password?: string } | undefined;
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
mode: "local",
auth: { token: "local-token-abc123" },
},
};
await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
deep: true,
deepTimeoutMs: 50,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
probeGatewayFn: async (opts) => {
capturedAuth = opts.auth;
return {
ok: true,
url: opts.url,
connectLatencyMs: 10,
error: null,
close: null,
health: null,
status: null,
presence: null,
configSnapshot: null,
};
},
});
expect(capturedAuth?.token).toBe("local-token-abc123");
});
it("prefers env token over local config token", async () => {
process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN = "env-token";
let capturedAuth: { token?: string; password?: string } | undefined;
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
mode: "local",
auth: { token: "local-token" },
},
};
await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
deep: true,
deepTimeoutMs: 50,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
probeGatewayFn: async (opts) => {
capturedAuth = opts.auth;
return {
ok: true,
url: opts.url,
connectLatencyMs: 10,
error: null,
close: null,
health: null,
status: null,
presence: null,
configSnapshot: null,
};
},
});
expect(capturedAuth?.token).toBe("env-token");
});
it("uses local auth when gateway.mode is undefined (default)", async () => {
let capturedAuth: { token?: string; password?: string } | undefined;
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
auth: { token: "default-local-token" },
},
};
await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
deep: true,
deepTimeoutMs: 50,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
probeGatewayFn: async (opts) => {
capturedAuth = opts.auth;
return {
ok: true,
url: opts.url,
connectLatencyMs: 10,
error: null,
close: null,
health: null,
status: null,
presence: null,
configSnapshot: null,
};
},
});
expect(capturedAuth?.token).toBe("default-local-token");
});
it("uses remote auth when gateway.mode is remote with URL", async () => {
let capturedAuth: { token?: string; password?: string } | undefined;
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
mode: "remote",
auth: { token: "local-token-should-not-use" },
remote: {
url: "ws://remote.example.com:18789",
token: "remote-token-xyz789",
},
},
};
await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
deep: true,
deepTimeoutMs: 50,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
probeGatewayFn: async (opts) => {
capturedAuth = opts.auth;
return {
ok: true,
url: opts.url,
connectLatencyMs: 10,
error: null,
close: null,
health: null,
status: null,
presence: null,
configSnapshot: null,
};
},
});
expect(capturedAuth?.token).toBe("remote-token-xyz789");
});
it("ignores env token when gateway.mode is remote", async () => {
process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN = "env-token";
let capturedAuth: { token?: string; password?: string } | undefined;
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
mode: "remote",
auth: { token: "local-token-should-not-use" },
remote: {
url: "ws://remote.example.com:18789",
token: "remote-token",
},
},
};
await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
deep: true,
deepTimeoutMs: 50,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
probeGatewayFn: async (opts) => {
capturedAuth = opts.auth;
return {
ok: true,
url: opts.url,
connectLatencyMs: 10,
error: null,
close: null,
health: null,
status: null,
presence: null,
configSnapshot: null,
};
},
});
expect(capturedAuth?.token).toBe("remote-token");
});
it("uses remote password when env is unset", async () => {
let capturedAuth: { token?: string; password?: string } | undefined;
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
mode: "remote",
remote: {
url: "ws://remote.example.com:18789",
password: "remote-pass",
},
},
};
await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
deep: true,
deepTimeoutMs: 50,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
probeGatewayFn: async (opts) => {
capturedAuth = opts.auth;
return {
ok: true,
url: opts.url,
connectLatencyMs: 10,
error: null,
close: null,
health: null,
status: null,
presence: null,
configSnapshot: null,
};
},
});
expect(capturedAuth?.password).toBe("remote-pass");
});
it("prefers env password over remote password", async () => {
process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_PASSWORD = "env-pass";
let capturedAuth: { token?: string; password?: string } | undefined;
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
mode: "remote",
remote: {
url: "ws://remote.example.com:18789",
password: "remote-pass",
},
},
};
await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
deep: true,
deepTimeoutMs: 50,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
probeGatewayFn: async (opts) => {
capturedAuth = opts.auth;
return {
ok: true,
url: opts.url,
connectLatencyMs: 10,
error: null,
close: null,
health: null,
status: null,
presence: null,
configSnapshot: null,
};
},
});
expect(capturedAuth?.password).toBe("env-pass");
});
it("falls back to local auth when gateway.mode is remote but URL is missing", async () => {
let capturedAuth: { token?: string; password?: string } | undefined;
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
gateway: {
mode: "remote",
auth: { token: "fallback-local-token" },
remote: {
token: "remote-token-should-not-use",
},
},
};
await runSecurityAudit({
config: cfg,
deep: true,
deepTimeoutMs: 50,
includeFilesystem: false,
includeChannelSecurity: false,
probeGatewayFn: async (opts) => {
capturedAuth = opts.auth;
return {
ok: true,
url: opts.url,
connectLatencyMs: 10,
error: null,
close: null,
health: null,
status: null,
presence: null,
configSnapshot: null,
};
},
});
expect(capturedAuth?.token).toBe("fallback-local-token");
});
});
});